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ABSTRACT
We combine data from the housing market with data from the North Carolina Sex Offender Registry
to estimate how individuals value living in close proximity to a convicted criminal. We use the exact
location of sex offenders to exploit variation in the threat of crime within small homogenous groupings
of homes, and we use the timing of sex offenders' arrivals to control for baseline property values in
the area. We find statistically and economically significant negative effects of sex offenders' locations
that are extremely localized. Houses within a one-tenth mile area around the home of a sex offender
fall by 4 percent on average (about $5,500). We also find evidence that the effect varies with distance
within this range -- houses next to an offender sell for about 12 percent less while those a tenth of
a mile away or more show no decline. We combine our willingness-to-pay estimates with data on sexual
crimes against neighbors to estimate the costs to victims of sexual offenses. We estimate costs of over
$1 million per victim -- far in excess of estimates taken from the criminal justice literature. However,
we cannot reject the alternative hypotheses that individuals overestimate the risk posed by offenders
or view living near an offender as having costs exclusive of crime risk.
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1. Introduction 
Crime is predominantly a local issue.  The majority of both violent and non-violent 
offenses take place less than one mile from victims’ homes, and most government expenditures 
on police protection are local (Bureau of Justice Statistics (2004), Census of Governments 
(2003)).  In response to crime risk, residents generally have two options: they can vote for anti-
crime policies, or they can vote with their feet.  When individuals exercise the latter option, local 
response to crime will be observed in the housing market.  This may be particularly salient for 
crime, since individuals can reduce their exposure without moving great distances, and empirical 
evidence on urban flight supports this notion (Cullen and Levitt (1999)). 
Understanding the relationship between property values and local crime risk is useful for 
measuring the willingness of individuals to pay to reduce their exposure to crime risk. This in 
turn can help determine the appropriate level of public expenditures that reduce crime, such as 
police services.  A number of papers have documented an inverse relationship between property 
values and local crime rates.  In one of the earliest studies, Thaler (1978) finds a negative 
relation between property crimes per capita and property values.  His estimates imply that a one 
standard deviation increase in the incidence of property crime reduces home values by about 3 
percent.  A more recent study by Gibbons (2004) finds a decrease in property values of 10 
percent for a one standard deviation increase in property crime. 
These studies, however, face omitted variable problems in both the cross section and time 
series.  In the cross section, crime rates are likely to co-vary with other geographic amenities for 
which researchers cannot adequately control.  Over time, crime rates may change as the 
characteristics of neighborhoods change.  Reductions in crime, for example, may correspond to 
other changes that increase the value of property located in a particular neighborhood.   - 2 -
In this paper, we combine data from the housing market with data from sex offender 
registrations to estimate individuals’ valuation of living in close proximity to a convicted 
criminal.  By exploiting both the timing of move-in and the exact locations of sex offenders, we 
can improve on past estimates of the impact on crime risk on property values.  The exact location 
of these offenders then allows us to exploit variation in the threat of crime within small, 
relatively homogenous groupings of homes.  The timing of a sex offender’s arrival allows us to 
confirm the absence of substantive pre-existing differences in property values and to control for 
the remaining minor differences. 
Our study is the first to exploit both inter-temporal and cross-sectional variance in the 
presence of an offender, but not the first to exploit the cross-sectional variance alone.  Larsen et 
al. (2003) examine the cross sectional relationship between property values and proximity to sex 
offenders using a single year of data from Montgomery County, Ohio. They find that houses sell 
for 17 percent less within a tenth of a mile of an offender’s home, and find significant differences 
in price up to a third of a mile from offenders’ locations.  Although their study is similar to ours 
in the empirical question it addresses, their empirical strategy suffers from the same potential 
biases mentioned above.  Indeed, applying their empirical strategy on our data, we estimate that 
property values are 19 percent lower near sex offenders. However, most of this difference 
reflects the fact that sex offenders tend to live in areas where house prices are lower, on average. 
Sex offender registries are not simply an important source of data for research.  The 
advent of sex offender registration laws and public access to offender registries has changed the 
kind of information available to individuals about their propensity for being victimized by a 
crime.  Based on the belief that an individual convicted of a sex offense is likely to commit a 
similar crime in the future, these registries publish the names, addresses, and sometimes even the   - 3 -
employers of convicted sex offenders.  Thus, individuals can now find out not only historical 
crime rates, but also the number of specific types of criminals living in an area and, usually, their 
exact addresses. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that individuals are extremely averse to living in close 
proximity to convicted criminals and that they have put the information obtained from the 
offender registries to use.  Neighbors have encouraged sex offenders to leave neighborhoods 
(Bell (1998)).  Questions have been raised about whether sellers are responsible for disclosing 
the presence of local sex offenders (Bruss (2006)).  Owners have reported extreme difficulty 
selling houses near known sex offenders (Miller (2007)).  In addition, a small but growing 
number of state and local governments have passed laws that would prevent sex offenders from 
living almost anywhere within their borders (Reischel (2006), Newsday (2005), Worth (2005)).  
For example, a Georgia law (currently under a restraining order from a federal judge) prohibits 
registered sex offenders from living within 1000 feet of schools, school bus stops, childcare 
facilities, public and private parks, recreation facilities, or churches—effectively barring sex 
offenders from any densely populated area in the state.  The law’s sponsor, Georgia House 
Majority Leader Jerry Keen, has said publicly that this is intentional, and that he hopes the law 
will “make it so onerous on those that are convicted of these offenses…they will want to move to 
another state” (Whoriskey (2006)). 
The results of our analysis suggest that these laws reflect more than just public posturing.  
We find that prices of homes near sex offenders decline considerably following an offender's 
arrival in the neighborhood.  We estimate that the average price of homes sold closest to the 
offender decline by roughly four percent (about $5,500).  However, this effect is extremely 
localized and dissipates quickly with distance.  We estimate that homes directly adjacent to an   - 4 -
offender decline in value by 12 percent, but we find no evidence of any impact on homes located 
more than a tenth of a mile away from offenders’ locations. 
  This paper is organized as follows.  In the next section, we describe Federal and North 
Carolina sex offender registration laws.  In Section 3, we describe the data used in our study, and 
then in Section 4, we describe our empirical methodology, present graphical evidence on the 
impact of sex offenders’ arrivals, and describe the model we use for formal statistical analysis.  
We present our empirical results in Section 5.  We use these results to estimate victimization 
costs of sexual offenses in Section 6, and we conclude in Section 7. 
 
2. Sex Offender Registration Data Bases 
In 1994, a seven year old girl named Megan Kanka was brutally raped and murdered by a 
neighbor.  The neighbor had been convicted in 1981 for an attack on a 5-year-old child and an 
attempted sexual assault on a 7-year-old, but none of his neighbors knew these facts.  This tragic 
event was the motivation for the body of legislation known as Megan’s Laws, which require 
public notification of the location and description of convicted sex offenders.  By imposing 
requirements on a class of individuals previously convicted of a crime after they have completed 
their sentences, these laws represent a significant change in the legal practice of dealing with 
convicted criminals after they have been released from prison. 
In 1994, the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender 
Registration Program mandated the registration of sex offenders at the state level.
2    Federal law 
requires all states to maintain a registry of convicted sexual offenders and make the information 
on the registry available to the public. The registry must include a range of identifying 
                                                 
2 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (2000).  Jacob Wetterling was abducted in Minnesota in 1989; neither he nor the perpetrators 
were ever found.   - 5 -
information including the offenders’ names, addresses, and photographs.  The law applies to 
individuals convicted of committing a specific set of sexual offenses and non-sexual crimes 
against minors.  Offenders are required to register this information with state authorities, update 
authorities regarding changes, and verify periodically the accuracy of the currently provided 
information.  Notably, registries are not required to contain information on when an offender 
moved into his/her current address.  To the best of our knowledge, North Carolina, Florida, and 
Montana are the only states that provide information on the exact timing of offenders’ move-in 
dates. 
Congress expanded this legislation in 1996 to require the dissemination of registry 
information.  In 2006, “Dru's Law” (after Dru Sjodin, a victim of a registered sex offender from 
another state) set up a national registry through which individuals can perform a national search 
for information about sex offenders.  According to the National Center for Missing and 
Exploited Children, there were over 600,000 registered sex offenders in the United States as of 
February, 2007.  Because registration laws in many states did not apply to offenders who were 
already released from prison, this may substantially understate the number of convicted sex 
offenders nationwide. 
Megan’s Laws have been extremely controversial and subjected to numerous legal 
challenges.  Two such challenges reached the Supreme Court in 2003. The first, Connecticut 
Department of Public Safety et al. v. Doe, claimed that registration laws violated the due process 
clause of the 14th amendment by depriving registered sex offenders of a “liberty interest” and 
depriving them of a hearing to determine whether they posed to a significant danger.  The second 
challenge, Smith et al. v. Doe, was brought on grounds that the registration laws violated the ex 
post facto clause in Article I of the Constitution by creating a retroactive punishment.  In both   - 6 -
cases, the Court has upheld the laws as a legitimate civil regulation (rather than a criminal 
punishment) in response to the recidivism threat imposed by sex offenders on the communities in 
which they live.    
While federal law requires registration of offenders and community notification, states 
are given significant latitude in their implementation of these provisions.  All 50 states currently 
maintain a registry which makes some information available to the public, but the method of 
compliance varies significantly.  Forty-six states provide public internet access to the offender 
registry.  Hawaii, South Dakota, and Oregon provide more limited access either only through 
local law enforcement agencies or only to small subsets of the data base.  Rhode Island provides 
no public access to the database, but requires the notification of individuals likely to be at risk 
from a given offender. 
Louisiana has perhaps the most aggressive notification law.  It requires offenders to “give 
notice of the crime for which he was convicted, his name, and his address to at least one person 
in every residence or business within a one mile radius of his residence in a rural area and a three 
tenths of a mile radius in an urban or suburban area [italics added].”  Louisiana courts can also 
require additional methods of notification including specially labeled clothing. 
Despite the legal controversies surrounding their creation, searchable sex offender 
registries are extremely popular.  In December of 2004, California unveiled a site that allowed 
residents to search the state’s registration database and obtain offenders’ names, addresses, and 
proximity to parks and schools.  On the first day that the state made the site publicly accessible, 
it was so popular that the host failed to keep up with demand.  Within 4 days, the site had 
registered 14 million visits. 
   - 7 -
2.1 North Carolina Sex Offender Legislation 
The North Carolina sex offender registration law is similar to many of the registration 
laws that exist in other states.  Originally adopted in 1996 as the “Amy Jackson Law,” All 
individuals convicted on or after January 1, 1996 of a sexual offense are required to register, as 
well as sexual offenders released from prison on or after January 1, 1996, even though their 
convictions took place prior to this date.  Individuals are required to register for 10 years after 
being released from prison.  The law applies equally to individuals convicted in other states who 
move to North Carolina. 
Sex offenders must register within 10 days of being released from prison and, if they 
move, they must notify the state of his or her new address registry within 10 days.  Failure to 
register an address is a felonious offense and cause for revocation of parole.  Individuals are 
required to register for 10 years after being released from prison.  In addition to these reporting 
requirements, the state is required to verify offenders’ addresses.   A non-forwardable post card 
is periodically mailed to each sex offender and, if this card is not returned, the local sheriff is 
required to verify whether or not the individual still resides at the registered address.  If the 
offender is no longer living there, he/she may be subject to criminal penalties. 
Information in the sex offender registry is provided to citizens via a web-based interface 
that is maintained by the State Bureau of Investigation’s Division of Criminal Information.  The 
registry reports each offender’s current address, zip codes of past addresses, the offense of which 
the individual was convicted, a picture of the individual, and identifying information such as 
height, weight, race, gender, distinguishing characteristics, hair color, and eye color.  All address 
entries include both the data on when the address was reported and, if the address was verified, 
the date on which the address was last verified.     - 8 -
The most recently available statistics from the North Carolina registry show that 
compliance with the sex offender registration law is very high.
3  Between January 1, 1996 and 
March 9, 2003, North Carolina released a total of 8,287 individuals who would be required to 
register.  Of these offenders, 1,007 (12 percent) had reported moving to another state. Of those 
remaining, 103 (1.4 percent) had failed to register their addresses.   Non-compliance by 
offenders convicted in other states but residing in North Carolina is impossible to measure, but as 
of January 2005, the fraction of offenders registered in North Carolina but convicted elsewhere 
(10%) was roughly equal to the fraction reported having moved (12%), suggesting that overall 
non-compliance is quite small.  This contrasts with the experience of California, for example, 




3. Data Sources 
Our analysis is based upon three sets of data regarding the locations of sex offenders, the 
locations and characteristics of properties in Mecklenburg County, and property sales data.  
January 2005 data on registered sex offenders in North Carolina were provided by the North 
Carolina Department of Justice (NCDOJ).  This dataset contains information on offenders’ basic 
demographics, type of offense, date of offense, current address, and date of registration at current 
address.  Because of the strict provisions governing timely registration in North Carolina, the 
date of registration is a close approximation of the actual date an offender moved to his or her 
current location. 
                                                 
3 Available at http://ncregistry.ncsbi.gov/(S(ptqa4wifhwwagd55nnxdvc45))/sexoffen/SEXMar12_2003.pdf 
4 Non-compliance by offenders convicted in other states but residing in North Carolina is impossible to measure.  
However, the in-flows and out-flows of reporting offenders are roughly equal; as of January 2005, the fraction of 
registered offenders convicted outside of North Carolina was 10 percent.   - 9 -
In January of 2005, there were approximately 9,200 registered sex offenders in North 
Carolina.  In Mecklenburg County, which contains the city of Charlotte, there were 518 
registered offenders, the most of any county in the state.  Table 1 shows crime frequencies for 
registered offenders in the state and in Mecklenburg County.  The vast majority of all sexual 
offenses committed by registered offenders fall into a small number of categories.  Sixty-eight 
percent of crimes are Indecent Liberty with a Minor (also known as “child molestation”), 11 
percent are Sexual Offense (sexual acts where force or violence is involved but do not include 
rape), 10 percent are Rape and 6 percent are Attempted Sex Offense or Attempted Rape.
 5  The 
statewide percentages are very similar. 
Our second source of data comes from the Mecklenburg County division of Property 
Assessment and Land Record Management.  This assessment data contains Geographical 
Information Systems (GIS) information on all real estate parcels in the county as of March, 2005.  
With GIS information, we can measure the distance in feet between the centers of any two 
parcels.  The assessment data also provides comprehensive physical characteristics for each 
parcel (e.g., number of bedrooms and bathrooms, square footage, etc.).  The Mecklenburg 
County tax assessor’s office also separates parcels into 1004 different “neighborhoods” that have 
similarly valued properties.  The relative homogeneity of property within neighborhoods allows 
us to control for unobservable fixed and time varying characteristics at the neighborhood level.  
These neighborhoods are much smaller than census tracts (there were 144 tracts in Mecklenburg 
                                                 
5 Indecent liberty refers to a person who, “1) Willfully takes or attempts to take any immoral, improper, or indecent 
liberties with any child of either sex under the age of 16 years for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire; 
or 2) Willfully commits or attempts to commit any lewd or lascivious act upon or with the body or any part or 
member of the body of any child of either sex under the age of 16 years.” (NC Statute 14-202.1).  This is distinct 
from statutory rape which covers acts of consensual sex involving children between the ages of thirteen and fifteen 
(NC Statute 14-27.7A).  Persons convicted of statutory rape are not required to register as sex offenders. 
One might suppose that the danger to neighbors, and thus the impact on house prices, might vary significantly across 
offenders depending on their criminal histories.  Although some crimes committed by registered offenders suggest 
that they pose less danger to neighbors (e.g., 2 percent of convictions were for Incest), these were too rare for us to 
attempt to estimate heterogeneous impacts of offenders by crime committed.   - 10 -
County in 1990) or even census block groups (there were 373 block groups in Mecklenburg 
County in 1990) and encompass just 0.47 square miles on average. 
In order to measure the proximity of property sales to offender locations, we matched 
offender addresses from the NCDOJ data to addresses in the assessment data. Of the 518 
offenders registered in the county, 66 could not be matched with a parcel in the assessment data.
6  
Additionally, 56 offenders were registered as living in a jail or halfway-house, and we drop them 
from our analysis. We then matched single family homes to the first offender to arrive within a 
three-tenths mile radius.  We chose 0.3 miles based on the Louisiana law requiring sex offenders 
to inform all neighbors living within this distance from their home of their presence.  We have 
found similar results using a 0.25 mile radius.  Homes matched to an offender were given an 
“arrival date” based on the date the offender registered his/her address and a “distance to 
offender” based on the distance to the offender’s parcel.  In this way, each offender creates an 
“offender area” of about 0.28 square miles—smaller than the average size of the neighborhoods 
defined in the assessment data. 
We merge the matched offender-assessment data with property sales from January 1994 
to December 2004, provided by the Mecklenburg County Property Assessment and Land Record 
Management Office.
7  Prices are normalized to December 2004 dollars using the monthly South 
Urban CPI and we drop sales outside the range of $5,000 to $1 million (i.e., the 1
st to 99
th 
percentile of the price distribution), giving us a total of 169,577 sales. 
                                                 
6  35 had an unknown street address, and 31 listed addresses that did not match a parcel in the assessment data.  Of 
the matched offenders, nearly all address matches were exact.  The only exceptions were four offenders whose street 
number could not be matched but whose street name, city, and ZIP code did match and whose street numbers 
seemed reasonably close to another parcel. For example, an offender who claimed to live on “838 Everett Place” 
was matched to “836 Everett Place.” 
7 We were able to match 96% of sales with an address in the assessment data.  33 offenders with matched addresses 
were not matched with any single family home sales.  We drop a small number of irregular sales entries (e.g., sales 
that took place less than 3 days following another sale of the same parcel).  Parcels in which the registered offenders 
reside have also been dropped from the sample.   - 11 -
We limit our analysis to offenders who had lived in their current location for one year or 
more and we examine sales that occur within a four year window surrounding offenders’ arrivals 
(i.e., two years pre-, two years post).
8  These sample limitations ensure that we observe (roughly) 
equal pre- and post- periods for each of the offenders.  (We find similar results if we include 
offenders who had lived in their current location for at least six months.)  Ultimately, we 
examine 9,086 sales that occurred within a 0.3 mile radius of 174 registered offenders and took 
place within two years of the offenders’ arrivals; 1,344 of these 9,086 sales occurred within 0.1 
miles of an offender location. 
Table 2 provides summary statistics of the various parcels that are sold in Mecklenburg 
County during the period of interest.  The first column provides information on all sales in the 
county and the second column shows the sales that occur within 0.3 miles of where a sex 
offender either has located or will eventually locate.  This demonstrates the importance of the 
localized data we use in this analysis because the areas in which sex offenders locate have 
smaller houses that sell for less money.  In other words, sex offenders, on average, move to the 
cheaper neighborhoods of Mecklenburg County.  Column three provides a hedonic 
decomposition of the log of the sale price of homes within 0.3 miles of an offender to gauge the 
importance of the various characteristics.  The regression also includes dummy variables for the 
composition of the house’s exterior and offender area by year fixed effects.  These control 
variables are included in our subsequent regression analysis, but, for simplicity, we do not report 
these coefficients in the tables below. 
                                                 
8 29 offenders have a missing move-in date, and we exclude them from our analysis.  Seven offenders had no sales 
occur within a 0.3 mile radius during the four-year window around their arrival date.  153 offenders had lived in 
their current address for less than one year (including 38 offenders who were released from prison less than a year 
prior to the end of our sales data).  This leaves us with 174 offenders.  Thus, it is possible that our estimates might 
not be representative of the effects of the average sex offender moving into a neighborhood if offenders that move 
frequently would cause different changes in property values than offenders who choose to live in a single place for 
an extended period of time.  Unfortunately, measuring the impact of itinerant offenders is not possible given their 
short durations and our reliance on sales data.    - 12 -
 
4. Empirical Methodology 
Choice of residence represents choice of labor market, school quality, social group, 
environment, etc., in addition to choice of house characteristics.  The demand for homes in areas 
with particular characteristics is therefore also a measure of individuals’ preferences regarding 
all of the local factors that impact economic outcomes.  A large number of studies have 
examined the relation between property values and location specific (dis)amenities, such as 
school quality, pollution, crime, and property taxes.
9   
The difficulties in identifying the hedonic price function for local (dis)amenities are well-
known.  A major obstacle is that variation in the local amenity may be correlated with 
unobservable factors (Bartik (1987), Epple (1987)).  In addition, if the long-run supply of 
housing is elastic, then changes in demand for local property will, in equilibrium, show up in 
quantities, not prices (Edel and Sclar (1974)).  Thus, an effective empirical strategy for 
uncovering capitalization might examine short run changes in property values due to arguably 
exogenous changes in local (dis)amenities.
10 
Sex offenders, like all individuals, are likely to choose to live in particular 
neighborhoods, depending on their income and preferences.  As illustrated in Table 2, sex 
offenders do tend to move to areas that, on average, have lower property values.  The covariance 
                                                 
9 Some recent examples are Black (1999), Colwell et al. (2000), Lynch and Rasmussen (2001), Bui and Mayer 
(2003), Davis (2004), Gibbons (2004), Figlio and Lucas (2004), and Chay and Greenstone (2005). 
10 Though we focus on changes in property values in the short-run, long-run impacts are also important.  For 
example, neighbors may perceive more risk over time if the threat of the offender becomes more well-known or 
perhaps if an offender has lives in a community for a long time without re-offending, the perceived risk might 
diminish.  Nevertheless, long run price responses are more difficult to identify, since changes in neighborhood 
characteristics will impact the quality and quantity of housing, not just prices, when supply can adjust (Kane et al. 
(2003)).  For example, the continued presence of a sex offender in a neighborhood may reduce investment in 
existing housing and deter development of new housing.  High mobility among sex offenders also limits the extent 
to which a long-run analysis would be possible – many of the offenders in our data have lived in their current 
residence for less than two years.     - 13 -
of sex offender location and both observable and unobservable neighborhood characteristics 
makes it difficult to identify the effect of sex offenders on property values by comparing areas 
with sex offenders to areas without them. 
Rather than compare aggregated areas, however, we know the specific locations in which 
sex offenders have chosen to live and the date of their arrival.  Compared to previous studies, 
this provides several advantages.  The specific location data allows us to compare the value of 
home sales within very small areas in which the housing stock is more homogenous than in 
normal aggregate comparisons.  This notion is illustrated by Figure 1, which shows the location 
of one of the sex offenders in our data, the surrounding parcels grouped by neighborhood, and a 
circle that outlines all parcels located within 0.3 miles of the offender’s location.  The offender’s 
particular choice of residence is extremely close to some houses in the neighborhood and farther 
from others.  Moreover, houses in adjacent neighborhoods vary in their distance from the 
offender’s location. 
Relying on cross sectional variation alone, however, would be problematic if property 
characteristics vary within these small areas in ways that are unobservable to the researcher.  If, 
for example, sex offenders move into the cheapest property available in a given area (e.g., next to 
a local “eye-sore” like the home of a resident who has allowed his or her property deteriorate 
significantly, the artist who decided to paint his house fluorescent pink, or the local mechanic 
who has turned his or her front yard into a garage), then variation in the sale value of property 
around the sex offender’s home may reflect distaste for the location to which the offender moved 
rather than distaste for living near the offender. 
This is a constant concern in the literature that attempts to exploit variation in housing 
prices along geographic administrative boundaries (see Bayer et al. (2004a)).  We therefore   - 14 -
examine within-neighborhood variation in property values shortly before and after the arrival of 
a sex offender.  This allows us to control for pre-existing differences in property values between 
homes closer to the offender and homes farther from the offender within the same neighborhood.  
This framework would only be compromised if sex offenders consistently moved into properties 
near which a localized disamenity was likely to emerge.  This possibility seems unlikely when 
one considers that the nature of the search for housing is also a largely random process at the 
local level.  Individuals may choose neighborhoods with specific characteristics, but within a 
fraction of a mile, the exact locations available at the time individuals seek to move into a 
neighborhood are arguably exogenous (Bayer et al. (2004b)). 
One important caveat in our methodology is that, like all such studies, we only can 
observe prices for houses that sell.  If the composition of individuals buying or selling a home 
changes with an offender’s arrival, for example, the prices that we observe may not be indicative 
of the average willingness-to-pay not live near a sexual offender in these neighborhoods.  For 
example, it is possible that households who sell their homes after the arrival of sex offender are 
those with a higher than average willingness to pay to avoid the risks posed by the offender.  If 
these families set lower reservation prices, this will tend to lower observed sales prices.
11  
However, by the same intuition, households who buy these homes would be more likely to have 
a lower than average willingness to pay to avoid offenders, and would not demand a large 
discount.  Thus, it is unclear whether selection/composition of buyer or seller characteristics 
would lead us to overestimate or underestimate the average willingness to pay by other types of 
households.  This issue is present in all empirical work on local amenities and property values, as 
                                                 
11 For empirical evidence on the impact of seller reservation prices and seller characteristics on sales prices, see 
Genovese and Mayer (1997, 2001) Glower, Haurin, and Hendershott (1998), Harding, Rosenthal, and Sirmans 
(2003) and Goetzmann and Peng (2006).   - 15 -
well as in the literature on compensating differentials in the labor market.  Unfortunately, 
without data on buyer or seller characteristics, we cannot examine this issue in our context.   
 
4.1 Graphical Evidence 
  If living close to a sex offender has a negative impact on property values, we should see 
prices of homes near the offender's location fall subsequent to the offender's arrival.  Moreover, 
we should observe a larger impact on homes closest to the offender.  Figure 2a shows the price 
gradient of distance to sex offenders’ locations during the year after offenders’ arrivals.
12  Prices 
are lowest for homes closest to the offenders, rise with distance until reaching homes about 0.1 
miles away, and then flatten out. 
Figure 2b adds the price gradient of distance to sex offenders’ locations during the year 
before offenders’ arrivals.  The price gradients are quite similar between 0.1 and 0.3 miles from 
the offender before and after arrivals.  However, there is a clear decline with proximity to a sex 
offender for homes within 0.1 miles of the offender.  Homes located .05 miles from the offender 
sold for about $145,000 on average before the offenders arrived, but sold for almost $125,000 
afterwards.  The decline in sale price was greater for homes even closer to the offender. 
  The notion that the price decline within 0.1 miles of an offender reflects a causal impact 
of the offender's arrival would be supported if the decline coincides with the offender's arrival 
and does not reflect a pre-existing downward trend in prices.  Figure 3a shows the price gradient 
of time with respect to sex offenders’ arrivals.  This gradient is measured separately for the two 
years before and after offenders’ arrivals.  Time is measured in days relative to the date sex 
                                                 
12 Price gradients are calculated using a locally weighted polynomial estimator, sometimes referred to as a “Fan 
regression” (Fan, 1992; Fan and Gijbles, 1996).  Within the specified bandwidth, this estimator performs a kernel 
weighted linear regression using the Epanechnikov kernel.  Compared to other non-parametric estimators (such as 
traditional kernel estimators), this estimator does not suffer from boundary bias problems, allowing us to more 
efficiently estimate breaks in the data series.   - 16 -
offenders arrive.  If the price decline showed in Figure 2a reflected a pre-existing trend, we 
would expect to see a gradual downward price movement over this time period.  Instead, we find 
a fairly sharp decrease in prices coincident with offenders’ arrivals. 
Figure 3b shows the price gradient with respect to offenders’ arrivals both for prices 
within 0.1 miles and houses between 0.1 miles and 0.3 miles of the offender's locations.  These 
latter homes are still quite close to the offenders’ locations and (as we saw in Figure 2a and 2b) 
were selling at similar prices to the affected homes prior to the offenders’ arrivals.  In contrast to 
the homes closest to the offenders, prices in these proximate areas did not decline after the 
offenders’ arrivals.  It is plausible that the two groups of homes would have had the same trend 
in prices over time in absence of the offender.  This counterfactual is given support by the fact 
that prior to arrivals the prices of homes between 0.1 and 0.3 miles was similar to that of homes 
within 0.1 miles of the offenders’ locations.  If so, then these homes slightly farther away from 
offenders can be used as a control group for measuring the impact of offenders on property 
values. 
 
4.2 Statistical Estimation Framework 
We proceed by estimating empirical models inspired by the graphical evidence: a cross 
sectional difference estimator and a difference in differences estimator.  First, we use the cross-
sectional difference estimator to check for pre-existing differences in the characteristics of 
parcels located within 0.1 miles of an offender and those located between 0.1 and 0.3 miles of an 
offender.  Given the similarity of these geographic areas, we then use a difference in differences 
model in which homes that are sold within 0.1 and 0.3 miles of an offender are used as controls 
for homes that are sold within 0.1 miles of an offender.   - 17 -
The simple difference model takes the following form: 
  ( ) ijt ijt t ijt D P ε π α + + =
10
1
1 log  (1) 
The log of the deflated sale price of the house is a function of a measure of distance from the 
offender, a random error term (allowing for year specific correlation in prices by offender area) 
and  t α , a year specific effect.  The term, 
1
10
ijt D , is an indicator variable set to one if a parcel sale 
occurs within 0.1 miles of an offender’s address.  To examine variation in other parcel 
characteristics, we simply substitute those characteristics for log sale price as the dependent 
variable. 
We also estimate a difference in differences specification where the counterfactual 
change in price for homes sold close to an offender is estimated using homes just slightly farther 
away.  Our difference in differences specification adds an indicator variable for homes within 0.3 
of a mile of offenders’ locations ( 10
3
ijt D ) and an interaction of this indicator with Postit. 
( ) ( ) ( )
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The difference-in value from changes in composition, we include all of the data on parcel 
sales from Mecklenburg County and estimate the decline in property values controlling for 
observable characteristics of the parcels.  Other sales in the county help us estimate the value of 
observable housing characteristics, hold these characteristics constant, and attribute the 




01 log * ijt jt i i i it ijt PX D D P o s t α βπ π ε =+ + + +     (2) 
where  i X  is a vector of housing characteristics including size, age, and quality measures and αjt 
is a neighborhood by year fixed effect.  The use of these fixed effects allows us to capture any 
differential movement of prices over time across neighborhoods, and to focus only on variation   - 18 -
in distance from offenders’ locations within neighborhoods.  The coefficient  1 π  is our estimate 
of the change in property values due to being located close to the offender. 
Finally, we estimate a difference-in-differences specification where the counterfactual 
time trend for homes close to an offender is estimated using the time trend in house prices for 
homes just slightly farther away.  Our difference in differences specification adds an indicator 
variable for homes within 0.3 of a mile of offenders’ locations (
3
10
ijt D ) and an interaction of this 
indicator with Postit. 
( ) ( ) ( )
33 11
10 10 10 10
00 11 log * ijt jt i ijt ijt ijt ijt it ijt PX D D D D P o s t α βω π ωπ ε =+ + + + + +  (3) 
The difference in differences estimate is then given by the term  1 π . 
 
5. Estimation Results 
5.1 Differences in Characteristics of Homes Located Close to an Offender 
Our estimation strategy hinges on the relative similarity of homes sold within 0.1 miles of 
an offender to homes sold between 0.1 and 0.3 miles of an offender.  While this is supported by 
the graphical evidence in Figures 2b and 3b, we formally estimate these differences in Table 3.  
We proceed by estimating Equation 1 using homes within 0.3 miles of an offender. 
First, we limit the sample to sales that took place before the offender’s arrival (Table 3 
Panel A).  We find little evidence of any preexisting differences in either sale price or house 
characteristics.  The only difference that is marginally statistically significant is the fraction of 
homes built in the same year in which they are sold. 
  Figure 4 shows the distribution of prices in these areas in more detail using a traditional 
kernel weighted density estimator, highlighting the small differences in homes in these areas.  
The distributions overlap significantly with three small differences: First, the area between 0.1   - 19 -
and 0.3 miles from where the offender will eventually locate have a small number of homes with 
values over $400,000.  Second, the area within 0.1 miles has slightly more homes in the 
$150,000 to $300,000 range than the area between 0.1 and 0.3 miles of the offender location.  
Finally, the area between 0.1 and 0.3 miles of an offender location has more homes that sell for 
$100,000 to $150,000. 
Sales need not be representative of parcels in general.  To allow for this possibility, Panel 
B of Table 3 compares the characteristics of all existing parcels, rather than just those that sell.  
These differences are similarly small, but, with a much larger sample.  As a result, the power of 
the hypothesis tests is sufficiently increased that these small differences are now distinguishable 
from zero. 
Overall, the results in Panels A and B of Table 3 demonstrates the relative homogeneity 
of the areas compared in our study.  The differences, for example, are smaller than the 
differences one would observe walking down a typical street in these areas.  Consider the largest 
difference that we observe – the 60-80 square foot difference in the size of homes.  The average 
standard deviation in the size of homes by street is 244 square feet (the size of a bedroom) or 
about 15 percent of the mean.  The difference of 60-80 square feet in average size between the 
areas is about the size of a walk-in closet.  Given the price elasticity with respect to size (Column 
3 of Table 2) this increase in home size is worth about two percent of the average house price.  
The average standard deviation of sale price on the same street within offender areas is 16 
percent of the street’s average price. 
 
5.2 The Impact of the Arrival of a Sex Offender   - 20 -
For illustrative purposes, we first present estimates of Equation 1, including sales of all 
homes in Mecklenburg County, sale-year fixed effects, but no other control variables.  The 
estimate of π1 from this specification is simply a measure of the average price difference between 
houses within 0.1 miles of an offender’s future location and other houses sold within the same 
year.  This difference is approximately 34 percent (Column 1 of Table 4), and confirms that 
homes close to offenders’ locations are cheaper than in other parts of the county.  However, 
when we include neighborhood-year fixed effects and house characteristics in the regression 
(Column 2 of Table 4), we estimate that homes within 0.1 miles of an offender sell for only 0.7 
percent less on average.
13  This difference is not statistically different from zero at any 
reasonable confidence level.  These results demonstrate that the control variables in the 
regression capture almost all of the differences between areas in which offenders move and the 
rest of the county.  Controlling for these variables, sex offenders’ locations were not significantly 
less expensive than other parts of their neighborhoods prior to arrival. 
Estimating a simple pre-post comparison (Equation 2 without the indicator variables for 
parcels selling between 0.1 and 0.3 miles from the offenders), we find that homes located within 
0.1 miles of an offender’s location sold for 4.0 percent less on average than surrounding homes 
after the offender’s arrival (Column 3 of Table 4), but just 0.7 percent less on average prior to the 
offender’s arrival.  This 3.3 percent decline in price is statistically significant at the 8 percent 
level.  Estimating Equation 2—our difference in differences specification—we find a slightly 
higher estimate of the impact of a sex offender’s arrival.  This estimate is -4.1 percent, and is 
                                                 
13 Our controls include building quality, the square footage of the property, fireplaces, number of bedrooms, number 
of bathrooms, a dummy variable for properties built in the same year they are sold, the age of the house in years, and 
dummy variables for the number of stories, the external wall type, and air conditioning.  Building quality is 
measured on a thirty-six point scale.   There are six tiers of quality (e.g., “Below Average”), and within each tier 
there are 6 quality ranks (e.g., Below Average 1, Below Average 2…Below Average 6).  We include dummy 
variables for the six quality tiers and interactions of tier with the 1-6 within tier ranking. The coefficients from our 
regressions confirm the lexicographic nature of the quality rating system.   - 21 -
statistically significant at the 4 percent level (Column 4).  The estimated change in value for 
homes located between 0.1 and 0.3 miles of an offender’s location when the offender arrives is 
positive (1 percent) but statistically insignificant.  Thus, homeowners living just slightly farther 
away from the offender (between 0.1 and 0.3 miles) experienced no decrease in property values 
on average.
14  
This is a sizable loss.  Single family homes within 0.1 miles of offenders’ locations sold 
for about $135,000 in the two years prior to the offenders’ arrivals.  Thus, our estimates suggest 
that homeowners who live extremely close to a sex offender and sell their homes lose about 
$5,500 relative to the amount they would have received if the offender did not move in. If these 
effects are representative of the impacts of the 373 offenders known to live in private residences 
in Mecklenburg County, then they collectively depress property values by an estimated $60 
million. This suggests that households would be willing to pay a high cost for policies that 
remove sexual offenders from their neighborhoods. 
Implicit in our estimation strategy is the assumption that the relationship between housing 
characteristics and prices outside of the offender areas are valuable in estimating the relationship 
between characteristics and prices within the offender areas.  If the relationship between house 
characteristics and prices were systematically different in offender areas and non-offender areas, 
this could affect our results. We therefore re-estimate Equation 2 using only the data from the 
offender areas (Column 5 of Table 4).  Rather than controlling for neighborhood by year fixed 
effects, we instead control for offender area by year fixed effects and estimate standard errors 
clustering at the offender area level.  These results are consistent with those in Columns 3 and 4, 
                                                 
14 In this specification, we assume that the effect is constant over the two year period after the offender arrives.  
Figures 3a and 3b support this assumption.  We have, however, tested this by running regressions that add 
interactions between the arrival of an offender and a sale taking place at least one year after the offender’s arrival.  
The interactions were not statistically significant and the point estimates were extremely small (results available 
upon request), confirming the patterns seen in the raw data.     - 22 -
suggesting that using additional data from sales outside of offender areas did not bias our 
estimates. 
While these differences document the average change in prices resulting from the arrival 
of a sex offender, Figures 2a and 2b suggest that property closest to the offenders’ location 
declines more steeply in value after the arrival of the offender.  To check for this heterogeneity in 
the treatment effect, we add an interaction of the dummy variable indicating a sale within 0.1 
miles of an offender after the offender has moved in with distance from the offender.  (Note that, 
for ease of interpretation, we rescale distance so that 1 equals 0.1 miles.)  The results are 
consistent with the figures.  Parcels directly adjacent to the offenders’ location are estimated to 
decline in value by 11.5 percent, and parcels a tenth of a mile away experience virtually no 
change in value (Table 4 Column 6). 
These effects on property values are similar in magnitude to the effects of other changes 
in local amenities and disamenities found in other recent studies.  The average effect (4 percent) 
is slightly larger than the effect of attendance rights at the higher scoring of schools serving 
adjacent neighborhoods (2.5 percent) found by Black (1999) and reductions in air pollution 
caused by EPA regulation (2 percent) found by Chay and Greenstone (2005).  The effect of 
having a sex offender move into the adjacent property (11.5 percent) is closer to the impact of a 
cancer cluster on child leukemia risk (14 percent) found by Davis (2004) and the temporary one-
year impact of getting an “A” (instead of a “B”) school quality rating (20 percent) found by 
Figlio and Lucas (2004). 
In addition to their impact on sales prices, we find some evidence that sex offenders’ 
arrivals cause some households to decide to move.  We estimate the impact of sex offenders on 
the probability that a home sells, using a monthly panel of all parcels in the offender areas for   - 23 -
two years before and after the offender’s arrival date.  Column 7 of Table 4 presents the estimate 
of a linear regression of the probability that a parcel sells (measured in percentage points) within 
the difference in differences framework provided in Equation 2.  The results suggest that the 
arrival of an offender does increase the probability that nearby parcels sell by 0.13 percentage 
points.  This is a 20 percent increase from the baseline probability of sale of 0.57 percentage 
points. 
 
5.3 Falsification Tests 
Our analysis shows little evidence of any preexisting differences in homes located close 
to an offender relative to other homes in their neighborhoods.  However, it is theoretically 
possible that the decrease in values after offenders’ arrival is driven by differential trends in 
values for homes closest to an offender.  In other words, the prices of houses in offender areas 
may be trending over time in a different way than other houses in their neighborhoods.  For 
example, if houses located near the parcel where an offender moves were experiencing slower 
growth in prices, this could lead to a spurious negative “impact” of the offender's arrival.  We 
investigate this possibility by estimating Equation 2 in Table 4 using false arrival dates equal to 
two years and three years prior to offenders’ actual arrival dates.  In both of these specifications, 
we find no evidence of a spurious effect (Table 5). 
 
6. Estimates of the Cost to Victims of Sexual Offenses 
The welfare cost to victims of crimes can be used to make optimal policy decisions, such 
as how much to spend on programs that reduce crime.  The results above present evidence that 
the arrival of a sex offender has a statistically and economically significant impact on the value   - 24 -
of homes in the immediate vicinity.  Households’ willingness to trade off lower house prices 
against increased victimization risk can be used to estimate the welfare cost of crimes committed 
by sexual offenders.  If the decline in property value close to offenders is indeed driven by 
increased risk of victimization, then we can make this calculation. 
The Department of Justice currently estimates victimization costs using other methods.  
In a widely cited DOJ study, Miller et al. (1996) estimate victimization costs for various crimes 
and include measures of tangible costs (e.g., medical expenses, lost work time, property loss etc.) 
and intangible costs (e.g., pain, suffering, fear, lower “quality of life”).  Estimates of tangible 
costs use a number of sources, but rely heavily on losses and injuries reported in the NCVS.  
Intangible cost estimates rely on data from jury awards to compensate victims (i.e., not punitive 
damages) and, for fatal crimes, the average value of life estimate across studies reviewed by 
Viscusi (1993).  For comparison, victimization cost estimates from this study are shown in Table 
6.  Adjusting the DOJ estimates to 2004 dollars, estimated average victimization costs of Rape 
and Sexual Assault are estimated to be roughly $114,000, 95 percent of which represents 
intangible costs.  In contrast, the estimated average victimization cost of Burglary is $2,000, 
almost all of which is due to direct costs such as property loss. 
Relying on survey responses and jury awards to estimate victimization costs is 
problematic to the extent that this information does not accurately reflect individuals’ willingness 
to pay to reduce crime risk.  For example, jury awards are often based upon testimony of experts 
who estimate intangible victimization costs from contingent valuation surveys.  Since these 
surveys require people to hypothetically make a trade-off between suffering from a crime and 
paying varying amounts of money, one might think that these surveys are likely to misstate the 
true amount an individual would be willing to pay to avoid being the victim of a crime.  Our   - 25 -
empirical strategy is to assume individuals accurately perceive the risks associated with the 
arrival of an offender and then to infer individuals’ willingness to pay to reduce crime risk using 
the actual distribution of crimes committed against neighbors by sex offenders. 
Our calculation is based on a simplistic model of the choice faced by the marginal 
homebuyer, whose preferences determine the price discount for living close to a convicted sex 
offender.  This household can choose to live far from a sex offender or to live close to an 
offender, get a price discount, and expose itself to higher crime risk.  The marginal home buyer 
will have equal utility under either choice, i.e., the discount for living near an offender will 
compensate them for the increased crime risk.  This notion is expressed by Equation 3, where 
utility is a function of lifetime wealth (w), the individual knows the discount (d) and the 
increased probability of crime (f(c)) for living near an offender, and vc is a scalar that maps crime 
victimization into an equivalent wealth loss. 
  ∫ − + = dc c f c v d w U w U c ) ( ) ( ) (  (3) 
For example, if we suppose that living close to a sex offender decreased property values by 
$5,000 and increased the risk of being the victim of one crime by 5%, then equation 4 can be 
restated as a choice between two simple lotteries: 
 
If the marginal household is risk neutral, the implied victimization cost would be $80,000. 
Our estimates suggest that property value declined by about 3.5% in areas within 0.1 
miles of an offender.  At the median price of homes sold in these areas prior to the offenders’ 
arrivals ($135,000), a 3.5% impact implies a decline in value of $4,725.Our estimates suggest 
100%  U(w) 
5% 
or 
95%  U(w+$5k) 
U(w+$5k-vc)   - 26 -
that property value declined by about 4 percent in areas within 0.1 miles of an offender.  At the 
median price of homes sold in these areas prior to the offenders’ arrivals ($135,000), a 4 percent 
impact implies a decline in value of $5,500.   We specify the utility function to have constant 
absolute risk aversion equal to 2.  This is generally considered a relatively high level of risk 
aversion, and perhaps even an upper bound given empirical evidence on labor supply decisions 
(Chetty (2005)).  We set lifetime wealth at $1.575 million.  This is the amount of annual income 
needed to obtain a mortgage equal to the value of the median home in our sample (about 
$35,000), multiplied over 45 years.
15 
The amount of additional crime risk faced by neighbors of sex offenders requires a more 
complex calculation.  We estimate the probability distribution with which offenders commit 
crimes against neighbors using data from the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), and the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS).   This calculation 
requires a number of steps and details are given in the Appendix.  We make a number of 
assumptions in this calculation, and we examine the sensitivity of our results to alternate 
assumptions.
16  The assumptions we make generally should lead us towards low estimates of 
victimization costs.  However, despite these choices, our estimates remain high relative to the 
lifetime income of our representative household. 
If neighbors are only concerned with the increased risk of sexual offenses (Rape and 
Sexual Assault) associated with living near a sex offender, then the assumption that c is scalar is 
fairly trivial and c would represent the number of sex offenses committed by the sex offender.  
                                                 
15 Lenders often follow the 28% rule: a family can pay up to 28% of gross monthly income (before other debt 
payments) as mortgage payments.  A 30-year fixed rate mortgage of $135,000 (the median home price) at 6% 
interest would give rise to payments of $810 per month.  Family income must therefore be about $2890 per month or 
about $35,000 per year. 
16 For example, the relationship of offender to victim is reported in the NCVS and “neighbor” and “stranger” are 
both potential responses.  Recognizing that some “strangers” may actually be “neighbors,” we assume that the true 
fraction of crimes committed by neighbors is 200% of the fraction of victims that claim the offender was a neighbor.    - 27 -
However, sex offenders commit many types of crime, ranging from Murder to Motor Vehicle 
Theft, and it seems reasonable that neighbors would be concerned with these crimes as well as 
sexual offenses.  In order to incorporate various types of crime into our simple model, c and vc 
must be specified as vectors. Unfortunately, we cannot separately calculate victimization costs 
for various crimes because we do not have variation in the willingness to pay to reduce the risk 
of various types of crime.  We only have the willingness to pay to not live near a sex offender, 
and therefore must maintain c as a scalar.  To do so, we assume that all crimes can be specified 
as a fraction or multiple of a sex offense.  For example, victims of a presumably less severe 
crime, such as Burglary, can be seen as suffering costs that are equivalent to a fraction of a sex 
offense.   
If we knew the relative severity of various types of crime, specifying all crimes in terms 
of sex offenses would be a straightforward exercise.  Because we do not know these relative 
severities ex ante, we must use estimates of relative victimization costs from some other source.  
We choose to use estimates from Miller et al. (1996) as a rough approximation to the relative 
costs of victimization among different types of crime, e.g., the relative cost of Assault is about 
30% the cost of Rape.
17   
  We estimate that each sexual offense has a wealth-equivalent welfare cost of about $1.2 
million.  Thus, the housing market impacts we identify above imply very large costs to victims of 
sexual offenses—an order of magnitude larger than the DOJ estimates.
18 We examine the 
sensitivity of our results to the assumptions embedded in our estimates by estimating 
                                                 
17 We find very similar results using relative victimization cost estimates from Cohen et al. (2004).  Our results do 
not change because they find very similar relative costs of crime, even though they use completely independent data 
from a contingent valuation survey. 
18 This is a much more significant difference than the usual difference between hedonic and contingent valuation 
studies.  Carson et al. (1996), for example, estimate that, on average, the estimates of contingent valuation studies of 
the value of public goods are about twenty percent lower than those of revealed preference studies (which include 
hedonic estimates).   - 28 -
victimization costs under wide-ranging alternate assumptions.  These alternative estimates, 
shown in Table 7, vary from about $0.6 to $2.5 million.  We therefore feel confident that the 
large implied welfare losses are not an artifact of the assumptions built into our calculation. 
There are, however, other potential explanations for the large implied costs we find.  
First, it may be that individuals overestimate the amount of crime risk associated with living in 
close proximity to a sex offender.  There is a longstanding literature that shows individuals tend 
to overweight rare events in making decisions under risk and tend to overestimate the actual 
probability of rare events (Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Lichtenstein et al. (1978) and Viscusi 
(1990, 1999)).  If individuals overestimate the risks posed by sex offenders, then cost estimates 
based on objective probabilities will be too high.
19  To illustrate the power of overestimation of 
risk, we recalculate our victimization cost estimates assuming that individuals believe that any 
crime sex offenders commit against a neighbor will happen to them.  Under this (albeit extreme) 
assumption, we estimate that sexual offenses have a victimization cost of $90,000 (bottom of 
Table 7). 
Another explanation for our results is that there is an additional cost—exclusive of crime 
risk—to living in close proximity to a released sex offender.  This additional cost could come 
from several sources.  First, it is reasonable to believe that individuals derive utility from 
interaction with their neighbors, and that this utility may vary with their neighbor’s 
characteristics (e.g., shared interests).  If individuals derive low utility from interactions with 
neighbors who are sex offenders, this could lead to a larger impact on house prices.  Second, 
there may be consumption losses that stem from the sex offender’s presence (e.g., your friends 
refuse to visit you).  Third, there may be a psychic cost to living near a sex offender, i.e., a cost 
                                                 
19 See Kask and Maani (1992) for further discussion of the implications of bias in subjective probability estimation 
for hedonic estimates of the willingness-to-pay to reduce the risk of hazardous events.   - 29 -
to living with increased fear of crime.  The cost of living in close proximity to an offender may 
include a constant reminder of the possibility of rare but tragic outcomes, such as those faced by 
the families of Megan Kanka and Jacob Wetterling. 
This last explanation is supported somewhat by the distance gradient of the impact of a 
sex offender’s arrival.  Recall that the impact of a sex offender’s arrival on housing prices is 
extremely localized.  We find no impact more than 0.1 miles (about 2 city blocks) from the 
offender’s location and the largest impacts are on the homes virtually next door to the offender.  
We do not know of any evidence on whether the expected change in crime risk should have a 
similar gradient, but it seems unlikely that the risk posed by the sex offender should decline so 
quickly in distance and be confined to such a small area.  However, it may be that those 
neighbors living closest to the offender are far more likely to be aware of his/her presence by 
passing by the offender’s home or coming into contact with the offender on the street. 
 
7. Conclusion 
We use the hedonic estimation methodology to measure the impact of crime risk on 
property values.  Using very detailed data on the locations of convicted sex offenders (whose 
identities and residential locations are made public on the North Carolina Sex Offender Registry) 
and the dates on which they move into a neighborhood, we estimate that on average the values of 
homes within 0.1 miles of an offender fall by roughly four percent.  This effect dissipates quickly 
with distance of homes from the offender; homes between 0.1 and 0.3 miles away show no 
effect.  Because we exploit the quasi-random process that introduces a convicted criminal into a 
very specific geographic area at a very specific time, we believe these results are a significant   - 30 -
improvement upon the existing literature that attempts to identify the causal relationship between 
the risk of crime and changes in property values. 
Our estimates suggest that individuals have a strong distaste for living in close proximity 
to a sex offender.  We estimate that a single offender depresses property values in the immediate 
vicinity by about $5,500 per home.  If we aggregate these effects across all homes affected and 
all offenders, we find that the presence of sex offenders depress property values in Mecklenburg 
County by about $60 million.  This suggests that households would be willing to pay a high cost 
for policies that remove sexual offenders from their neighborhoods. 
We also combine the estimated decline in property values with data on crimes committed 
by sexual offenders against neighbors to estimate costs to victims of sexual offenses.  To do so, 
we make two key assumptions: that the entire decline in property value is due to increased crime 
risk and that neighbors’ perceptions of risk match the objective data.  We estimate victimization 
costs of over $1 million—far in excess of estimates taken from the criminal justice literature, 
implying a high willingness to pay for policies that reduce the incidence of sexual offenses. 
Unfortunately, we cannot test the two assumptions underlying the victimization cost 
estimate.  It is possible that individuals substantially overestimate the risks posed by neighboring 
sex offenders or experience a cost—unrelated to crime risk—of living in close proximity to an 
offender.  If so, then the willingness to pay for policies that only decrease crime risk would be 
lower.  However, under these alternative hypotheses, households would be willing to support 
policies that provided accurate information regarding the risks posed by sex offenders or isolate 
sex offenders without decreasing crime risk.   - 31 -
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Appendix: Calculation of Crimes Committed Against Neighbors by Sex Offenders 
For illustrative purposes, suppose that there is only one kind of crime and that g(c) is the 
probability distribution of crimes committed by sex offenders.   Further, let us suppose that there 
is a constant probability that, conditional on crimes being committed, they are committed against 
neighbors (PN).  Finally, let us suppose that there is a constant number of neighbors (N) who are 
potential victims, that all neighbors are equally likely to be victims, and that crime, conditional 
on being committed against neighbors, is committed against a single neighbor.  The probability 
distribution of crimes committed against neighbors, f(c), will then be: 
N
P
c g c f
N ) ( ) ( =                
Under these assumptions, we can use data on g(c), PN, and N, to estimate f(c).    
If neighbors are only concerned with the increased risk of sexual offenses (Rape and 
Sexual Assault) associated with living near a sex offender, then the assumption that c is scalar is 
fairly trivial and c would represent the number of sex offenses committed by the sex offender.  
However, sex offenders commit many types of crime, ranging from murder to motor vehicle 
theft, and it seems reasonable that neighbors would be concerned with these crimes as well as 
sexual offenses.  Unfortunately, we cannot separately calculate victimization costs for various 
crimes because we do not have variation in the willingness to pay to reduce the risk of various 
types of crime.  To reduce the dimensionality of the problem, we assume that all crimes can be 
specified as a fraction or multiple of a sex offense.  For example, victims of a presumably less 
severe crime, such as burglary, can be seen as suffering costs that are equivalent to a fraction of a 
sex offense. 
If we knew the relative severity of various types of crime, specifying all crimes in terms 
of sex offenses would be a straightforward exercise.  Because we do not know these relative 
severities ex ante, we must use estimates of relative victimization costs from some other source.  
We choose to use the estimates listed in Table 6 from Miller et al. (1996) as a rough 
approximation to the relative costs of victimization among different types of crime, e.g., the 
relative cost of assault is about 30% the cost of rape.  It is important to note that, for our 
calculation, we only require that the relative costs of various crimes are estimated correctly in the 
Miller et al. (1996) study.  We find very similar results using relative victimization cost estimates 
from Cohen et al. (2004).  While the absolute measures of victimization costs are somewhat 
larger than those from Miller et al. (1996), they find very similar relative costs of crime. 
In order to estimate g(c), we first calculate the number and type of crimes for which sex 
offenders are arrested in the three years subsequent to their release from prison.  This 
information comes from “Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 1994,” a data set collected in 1998 
by the Bureau of Justice Statistics on prisoners released by 15 states. This data set includes all 
10,337 sex offenders who were released from these states in 1994, and gives a complete 
inventory of all arrests and adjudications of these offenders through 1998.  These states are: 
Arizona, California, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, 
New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Texas, and Virginia.  The data set also includes a 
stratified sample of all other prisoners released in these states in 1994.  Because this data 
contains offenders’ entire criminal histories, we treat as sex offenders all released prisoners who 
had previously been convicted of a sexual offense, not just those whose most current prison 
sentence was due to a sexual offense conviction. We use sampling probability weights to 
construct population averages.  We drop offenders for whom a record of arrests and prosecutions   - 36 -
(a “RAP sheet”) was not successfully located and offenders who died during the three years 
following their release.  We also drop a small number of offenders who had unknown arrest and 
adjudication dates (making it impossible to distinguish recidivism from prior criminal history) or 
had adjudication dates that preceded the arrest date for any given offense.  Importantly, we 
assume that these offenders’ subsequent behaviors are representative of the expected behavior of 
an offender in North Carolina.  If Megan’s Laws reduce crime, this may overstate risk.  
However, although crime reduction was a goal of this legislation, we know of no evidence to 
support this claim. 
Table A.1 shows the fraction of sexual offenders and other released criminals who are 
arrested for various crimes during the first three years after their release from prison.  Sex 
offenders are much more likely to be arrested for a sexual offense than other released criminals.  
The fraction of released sex offenders who are later arrested for rape and sexual assault are 2.1% 
and 4.0%, respectively.  Moreover, the ratio of arrests for sex offenders vs. other criminals is 
over 4:1 for Rape and over 5:1 for sexual assault.  Arrests of sexual offenders are similar to other 
released convicts for violent crime, though somewhat more likely for kidnapping and assault, 
and less likely for murder, manslaughter, and robbery.  Arrests of sex offenders are significantly 
less likely for non-violent crimes such as burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft. 
It is important to note that sample selection into this data set may overstate the frequency 
of arrests for all criminals at all times.  Almost all of the released criminals in our data spent a 
year in prison for their crimes, whereas 30% of sex offenders registered in North Carolina spent 
less than one year in prison.  Also, we examine offenders just after their release from prison, 
when they are most likely to recidivate.  Indeed, of sexual offenders’ arrests for rape and sexual 
assault, 37% and 49% (respectively) come in the first year after their release.  These one-year 
statistics are also reported in Table A.1. 
Not all crimes lead to arrests.  In order to calculate the crimes actually committed by 
offenders, we use statistics from Lee and McCrary (2005) on the fraction of crimes that are 
reported to the police and fraction of reported crimes that lead to an arrest (Table A.2).  Their 
calculations are based on comparisons of victimization reports from the National Crime 
Victimization Survey (NCVS) and crimes reported to the police and reported crimes that lead to 
arrests from FBI Uniform Crime Reports (UCR).  (See Appendix Table 2 of their study for 
further explanation.)  Because the NCVS and UCR data do not break out crimes into great detail, 
we assume that similar crimes have similar crime/arrest ratios. For example, we assume that the 
ratios are the same for rape and sexual assault. 
According to their estimates, for every individual arrested for a sexual offense, roughly 
four offenses had actually been committed (i.e., there is a crime/arrest ratio of 4:1).  Although we 
can use the estimates in Table A.2 to gauge crime/arrest ratios, we do not have estimates of the 
extensive and intensive margins of criminal activity.  In other words, even if the crime/arrest 
ratio is 4:1, it may be that (intensive) all four crimes were committed by the same offender who 
was arrested, or it may be that (extensive) four different offenders committed one crime each, but 
only one offender was arrested. 
We assume that the crime/arrest ratio is due entirely to the intensive margin, i.e., each 
arrest is indicative of multiple crimes, but non-arrested offenders do not commit crimes.  Given 
this assumption, the empirical distribution of arrests and the estimated crime/arrest ratios are 
sufficient to estimate the empirical distribution of crimes committed.  It is important to note that 
the intensive assumption—placing a larger number of crimes on a small number of offenders—  - 37 -
will lead us towards estimates of welfare costs that are lower, given risk aversion, than assuming 
that some of the crime-arrest ratio is due to offenders who commit crimes but are not arrested.
20 
We estimate the fraction of crimes committed against neighbors using the fraction of 
victims claiming that the offender was a neighbor in the concatenated NCVS files from 1993-
2004.  Because the NCVS cannot ask murder or manslaughter victims about their offenders, we 
use the 2003 Supplemental Homicide Reports (a subset of the UCR data) to estimate offenses by 
neighbors for these crimes.  This is, of course, only possible for crimes where the offender is 
known.  Murder and manslaughter are not separately identified in this data, so we combine them.  
For murder/manslaughter, rape, and sexual assault, the fractions of offenses committed by 
neighbors are 0.7%, 3.7% and 6.9%, respectively (Table A.3 column 1).  These figures suggest 
that the crime risk from neighbors may be quite small.  One potential problem with these 
measures is that victims may not know their neighbors.  The fraction of crimes committed by 
both neighbors and strangers is a possible alternate measure, but it is often an order of magnitude 
greater than the fraction committed by neighbors alone, and is likely to considerably 
overestimate crime risk from neighbors (Table A.3 column 2).  Recognizing the problems 
inherent in both measures, we assume that the true fraction of crimes committed by neighbors is 
200% of the fraction of victims that claim the offender was a neighbor. In other words, for every 
crime victim claiming the offender was a neighbor, another victim claimed the offender was a 
stranger when, in fact, the true offender was a neighbor.   
We estimate the number of households in the neighborhood among which crime risk 
from the sex offender is spread by measuring the number of single family homes located within 
one tenth of a mile of offenders in Mecklenburg County. The median number of single-family 
homes within one tenth of a mile of offenders’ parcels—at the time they moved in—is 120.  This 
is probably an underestimate of the number of relevant households facing the increased risk of 
crime, since it does not include other residential structures such as condominiums, multi-family 
homes and apartment buildings.
                                                 
20 This can be shown in the following manner:  Suppose there is a 1/N chance of being a victim of N crimes.  
Indifference to this risk implies  ) ( ) ( ) ( 1 1 d w U nv d w U w U N
N
N + + − + = − , where notation follows equation 4.  
As N increases, the probability of being a victim falls, but the number of crimes committed per victimization rises.  
This is essentially the intensive margin assumption.   dN
dv is the change in the wealth equivalent value of a single 
crime that sustains the equation when N rises.  Solving for  dN
dv yields an expression proportional to 
[] ) ( ' ) ( ) ( nv d w nvU nv d w U d w U − + − − + − + .  The term in brackets equals the loss in utility from 
victimization, which must be smaller than the second term if the agent is risk averse, i.e., if U’’<0.  For a risk neutral 
agent,  dN
dv  would be zero.   - 38 -
Figure 1: An Offender Area and Surrounding Neighborhoods 
 
Note: X marks the center of the offender’s exact location.  The surrounding circle marks all parcels within one-
quarter of a mile.  Neighborhoods are distinguished by shades of gray.  Parcels within a neighborhood are usually, 
but not necessarily, contiguous.   - 39 -
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Note: Results from local polynomial regressions (bandwidth=90 days) of sale price on days
before/after offender arrival.
Figure 3a: Price Trends Before and After Offenders' Arrivals
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Note: Results from local polynomial regressions (bandwidth=90 days) of sale price on days
before/after offender arrival.
Figure 3b: Price Trends Before and After Offenders' Arrivals
Parcels Within 1/3 Mile of Offender Location
   - 41 -
 Crime Committed Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
Indecent Liberty with a Minor 8874 71.6% 417 67.7%
Sex Offense 1338 10.8% 71 11.5%
Rape 1085 8.8% 66 10.7%
Attempted Rape or Attempted Sexual Offense 467 3.8% 35 5.7%
Sexual Exploit of Minor 261 2.1% 5 0.8%
Incest Between Near Relatives 152 1.2% 13 2.1%
Kidnapping Against a Minor - 1st and 2nd Degree 98 0.8% 6 1.0%
Felonious Restraint Against a Minor 55 0.4% 1 0.2%
Other 58 0.5% 2 0.3%
State Mecklenburg County
Table 1: Sexual Offenses Committed by Registered Offenders in North Carolina









Sale Price 2.048 1.438
($100,000) (1.324) (0.848)
Square Footage 2.075 1.620 0.294
     (1,000 Sq Ft) (0.880) (0.595) (0.011)*
Quality Rating
1 3.251 3.066 0.015
(1.208) (0.979) (0.005)*
Percentage Percentage
Air Conditioned 93.3% 84.6% 0.111
(0.011)*
Sold in Year Built 29.5% 19.6% -0.042
(0.012)*
Story Height
1 Story 39.4% 56.5%
1.5 Stories 6.4% 5.4% 0.058
(0.016)*
2.0 Stories 49.1% 32.5% 0.055
(0.011)*
3 or More Stories 1.6% 0.6% 0.131
(0.048)*
Split Level 1.1% 1.4% -0.019
(0.029)
Other 2.4% 3.5% -0.014
(0.021)
Bedrooms
1 Bedroom 0.1% 0.1%
2 Bedrooms 5.2% 11.4% 0.171
(0.094)+
3 Bedrooms 60.8% 71.8% 0.277
(0.094)*
4 Bedrooms 30.0% 15.5% 0.255
(0.095)*
5 Bedrooms 3.6% 1.1% 0.322
(0.101)*
6 Bedrooms 0.3% 0.1% -0.200
(0.150)
Bathrooms
1 Bathroom 14.1% 30.8%
2 Bathrooms 72.4% 65.1% 0.087
(0.012)*
3 Bathrooms 10.9% 3.7% 0.112
(0.024)*
4 Bathrooms 2.5% 0.4% 0.182
(0.064)*
Sample Size 170,239 9,092 9,086
R
2 0.75
Table 2: Characteristics of Homes Sold in Mecklenburg County, 1994-2004
1Quality is rated on a 6 point scale that tends from low quality to high quality; 
2Estimated for parcels sold in offender areas by 
regressing log(Sale Price) on listed variables and offender area by year fixed effects.














Within .1 Miles of Offender 0.007 0.062 -1.081 0.059 0.022 <.001
(0.034) (0.035)+ (1.117) (0.047) (0.034) (0.036)
Constant 11.605 0.186 16.616 1.589 3.050 1.716
(0.036)* (0.030)* (1.153)* (0.039)* (0.028)* (0.034)*
Sample Size 4497 4497 4497 4497 4497 4497
R2 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03
Panel B, Differences 









Within .1 Miles of Offender 0.205 -0.079 -0.048 -0.081
(1.050) (0.027)* (0.025)+ (0.024)*
Constant 37.671 1.538 2.992 1.585
(1.518)* (0.037)* (0.029)* (0.035)*
Sample Size 31856 31856 31856 31856
R2 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Table 3: Differences in Average Characteristics of Homes Sold Close to Offenders
Note: Pre-arrival (post-arrival) refers to the two-year period before (after) the date upon which the offender registered their current 
address.  Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the offender area level. * significant at 5% level; + signiProbability
of Sale
†
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Within .1 Miles of Offender -0.340 -0.007 -0.007 <.001 -0.006 -0.013 -0.033
(0.052)* (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.034)
Within .1 Miles * Post-Arrival -0.033 -0.041 -0.036 -0.115 0.125
(0.019)+ (0.020)* (0.021)+ (0.060)+ (0.059)*
Dist*≤.1 Miles* Post-Arrival 0.11
(0.1 Miles = 1) (0.065)+
Within 1/3 Miles of Offender -0.010
(0.007)
Within 1/3 Miles * Post-Arrival 0.010 0.010 0.010 -0.055
(0.010) (0.016) (0.017) (0.040)









0.0579 P-value = 0.0364
Housing Characteristics √ √√√√ √
Year FE √
Neighborhood - Year FE √√ √
Offender Area - Year FE √√ √
Restricted to Offender Areas
2 Years Pre- and Post-Arrival √√ √














Sample Size 164,993 164,968 169,557 169,557 9,086 9,086 1,519,364
R
2 0.03 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.75 0.75 0.01
Log(Sale Price)
Pre-Arrival Log(Sale Price), Pre- and Post-Arrival
Table 4: The Impact of Sex Offenders' Locations on Property Value and Sale Probability
Note: Pre-arrival (post-arrival) refers to the two-year period before (after) the date upon which the offender registered their current address.  Standard errors in 
parentheses. * significant at 5% level; + significant at 10% level; † Probability sale is measured as percentage points, e.g., Probability of sale = 1 would be 100 
percentage points.Baseline
Estimates
2 Year Prior 
Arrival Dates
3 Year Prior 
Arrival Dates
(1) (2)
Within .1 Miles of Offender <.001 -0.017 -0.013
(0.013) (0.016) (0.016)
Within .1 Miles * Post-Arrival -0.041 0.018 -0.004
(0.020)* (0.020) (0.020)
Within .25 Miles of Offender -0.010 -0.010 -0.012
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Within .25 Miles * Post-Arrival 0.010 -0.001 0.001
(0.010) (0.007) (0.008)






Sample Size 169,557 169557 169557
R
2 0.84 0.84 0.84
Table 5: Falsification Tests on Impact of Sex Offender Location
Note: The dependent variable is the log of house price.  All regressions contain neighborhood-year fixed 
effects and housing characteristics (see text for list of characteristics included). Baseline results are taken from 
column (4) of table 4. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by neighborhood.Type of Crime Cost ($2004)
Sexual Offenses









Motor Vehicle Theft $5,229
Table 6: Estimated Victimization Costs
Note: These cost estimates are taken from tables 2 and 4 in Miller et al. (1996). 
Their cost estimates are given in 1993 dollars. We adjust these for inflation using 
the 1993 and 2004 annual CPI for all urban consumers.  Victimization costs for 
kidnapping are not listed in their study and we therefore set equal to the cost of 
assault with injury against a child under the age of 11.Assumptions in Calculation Estimated Victimization Cost
Baseline Assumptions $1,242,000
Lower Risk Aversion (λ=1) $2,186,100
Higher Risk Aversion (λ=3) $890,000
Fewer Neighbors (60) $1,093,000
More Neighbors (180) $1,320,000
Fewer Offenses by Neighbors (100% of NCVS) $2,485,000
More Offenses by Neighbors (300% of NCVS) $621,200
Systematic Overestimation of Risk: Housholds Neglect to 
Realize that Risk is Spread Among Neighbors
$90,300
Table 7: Sensitivity of Victimization Cost of a Sexual Offense
Note: Baseline assumptions are as follows: (1) utility function with constant absolute risk aversion equal to 2, (2) 
lifetime wealth equals $1.575 million, (3) housing market discount equals $5,500, (4) neighborhood risk is spread 
among 120 neighbors, (5) the fraction of crimes committed against neighbors is 200% of the reported rates in the 
NCVS.Type Of Crime
Sexual Offenses 3 Years 1 Year 3 Years 1 Year
Rape 2.1% 0.8% 0.5% 0.2%
Sexual Assault  4.0% 1.9% 0.7% 0.3%
Violent Crimes
Murder 0.6% 0.3% 0.7% 0.3%
Manslaughter 0.1% 0.0% 0.2% 0.1%
Kidnapping 1.9% 1.1% 0.7% 0.3%
Robbery 4.3% 2.3% 6.2% 2.8%
Assault 14.1% 5.1% 13.5% 5.8%
Non-violent Crimes
Burglary 7.1% 2.8% 9.9% 5.4%
Larceny 11.0% 4.3% 16.5% 9.0%
Motor Vehicle Theft  3.0% 1.1% 4.6% 2.3%
Note: Shown are the fraction of released prisoners arrested for various crimes of 
prisoners released in 1994 during the years after their release from prison.  See the 
appendix for a description of this data set.
Other Criminals Sexual Offenders
Table A.1: Probability of Arrest After Release from Prison,
by Type of Crime and Type of CriminalTable A.2: Crime/Arrest Ratios from Lee and McCrary (2005)
Type Of Crime










Rape 45.0% 54.0% 4.12
Sexual Assault* " " 4.12
Violent Crimes
Murder 64.0% 77.0% 2.03
Manslaughter* " " 2.03
Robbery 26.0% 71.0% 5.42
Assault 57.0% 46.0% 3.81
Kidnapping* " " 3.81
Non-violent Crimes
Burglary 13.0% 58.0% 13.26
Larceny 18.0% 33.0% 16.84
Motor Vehicle Theft  14.0% 86.0% 8.31
Note: These figures are taken from appendix table II of Lee and McCrary (2005) and are 
the results of their calculations using data from the National Crime Victimization Survey 
and Uniform Crime Reports for 2002. "*" denotes that no information is on reporting and 
arrests was available for this crime and that it is assumed that reporting and arrests follow 
the same pattern as the preceding (similar) crime.Table A.3: Percent of Crimes Commited by Neighbors
Type Of Crime
% of Crimes 
by Neighbors













Motor Vehicle Theft  3.0% 50.7%
Note: With the exception of Murder and Manslaughter, these figures are 
calculated using victims' reports of offenders' identities in the 1993-2004 
Concatenated NCVS.  Figures for Murder and Manslaughter are calculated 
using data from the 2003 Supplemental Homicide Reports.  "*" denotes that 
information was not available for this crime and it is assumed that offenses by 
neighbors follow the same pattern as the preceding (similar) crime.